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i 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Certiorari was granted in this case on petition to 
this Court. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE 
HIGHWAY PATROL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
Petitioner was suspended from the Utah Highway 
Patrol with certain conditions for possible reinstatement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON CERTIORARI 
Petitioner seeks to have a portion of his suspen-
sion order modified, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After a hearing the Highway Patrol Civil Service 
Commission entered Findings of Fact and its Decision (R 23 
through 26) and ordered "„„,the removal of Roy M, Helm from 
the position of Superintendent of the Utah Highway Patrol 
effective December 31, 1975, with the following provisio: 
"CONDITIONAL RECOMMENDATION: 
Because of the long and dedicated service Super-
intendent Roy M* Helm has rendered to the State 
of Utah as a member of the Highway Patrol, and 
his advancement from a Radio Operator to his 
present position of Superintendent, and because 
he has acknowledged he has an alcohol problem, 
we recommend he be given reasonable time to 
rehabilitate himself...and if he successfully 
overcomes his problems, he be considered for 
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reinstatement in the Utah Highway Patrol, 
at a rating or rank to be determined by the 
Commissioner of Public Safety,* (R 26), 
Exception was taken to the portion pertaining to 
any discretion to be exercised by the Commissioner of Public 
Safety, and an Amended Decision and Findings entered (R 27-28) 
which modified the previous decision as follows * 
"Based upon its Findings entered on December 26, 
1975, and the foregoing, and based upon the merits 
of the Objections of Roy M, Helm, the Commission 
enters as its amended decision, the following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Roy M, Helm is removed 
as Superintendent of the Utah Highway Patrol and 
is indefinitely suspended from any employment 
of the Utah Highway Patrol, effective December 31, 
1975. Provided Roy M, Helm can resolve to the 
satisfaction of the Commission his alcohol prob^ 
lem, or other related problems which impair either 
his fitness or qualification to serve as a member 
of the Utah Highway Patrol, he may apply to the 
Commission for reinstatement as a member of the 
Utah Highway Patrol, Provided the Commission 
determines that Roy M, Helm has successfully 
rehabilitated himself so that he again qualifies 
for service in the Utah Highway Patrol, the Com-
mission shall direct the Commissioner of Public 
Safety to reinstate Roy M, Helm to the service 
of the Utah Highway Patrol, but at a rating or 
rank and a position to be determined by the Com*-
missioner of Public Safety, 
Dated this 7th day of January, 1976," (R 28), 
From the reference to "rating or rank and a posi-
tion to be determined by the Commissioner of^Public Safety" 
but not the portion wherein the ^Commission shall direct the 
- 2 -
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Commissioner of Public Safety to reinstate,, *,f a petition for 
writ of certiorari was filed with this Court for a review of 
that portion of the Amended Decision, 
POINT ON APPEAL 
THE HIGHWAY PATROL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ERRED 
IN LEAVING ANY DISCRETION TO THE COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
AS TO RATING, RANK OR POSITION TO BE GIVEN TO A REINSTATED 
EMPLOYEE OF THE HIGHWAY PATROL, 
No cross^petition has been sought by the Commissioner 
of Public Safety in this case challenging the non^excepted to 
portion of the Amended Decision which, thereforer must stand, 
Rule 74(b), U.R.C.P, In its discretion the Commission provided 
for petitioner's possible reinstatement after a proper showing 
of rehabilitation CR 27^28). 
The purpose of Civil Service Commissions is to sep-
arate politics from job performance, tenure, promotion, dis-
charge, and punishment. The general rule is set forth in 
15 Am. Jur. 2d 464, Civil Service; 
"§1. Purpose of civil service laws, 
... The civil service system rests on the 
principle of application of the merit system in-
stead of the spoils system in the matter of appoint-
ment and tenure of office. Civil service laws 
are not penal in nature, but are designed to eradi-
cate the system of making appointments primarily 
from political considerations with its attendant 
evils, to eliminate as far as practicable the 
element of partisanship and personal favoritism 
in making appointments, to establish a merit sys-
tem of fitness and efficiency as the basis of 
appointments, and to prevent discrimination in 
appointments to public service based on any con-
sideration other than fitness to perform its duties. 
While security of tenure in office is an important 
object of the civil service system, and it has Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
been said that civil service legislation was 
enacted for the security of the faithful employee 
by giving him permanence of employment, at least 
for the period prescribed by law, and to free 
such employee from the fear of political and 
personal prejudicial reprisal, civil service 
laws were intended as a protection for the pub-
lic as well as for the individual employee, 
Stated otherwise, civil service was not established 
for the sole benefit of public employees. In 
fact, it has been said that the primary purpose 
of civil service is to enable state, county, 
and municipal governments to render more effi-
cient services to the public by enabling them 
to obtain efficient public servants." 
Further, at page 494: 
"§33. Governmental regulation of separation 
or demotion, generally. 
... One of the purposes of civil service laws 
is to take from the appointing officer the 
right of arbitrary removal of an appointee?12 
absent such laws a public employee has no pro-
tection against suspension and removal and he 
may be suspended or removed with or without 
cause.13.m mw 
This rule has been adopted by Utah in 67-13-2, Utah Code Ann., 
as amended, as follows: 
"Establishment of state system - Purpose of act -
Principles recognized. - (a) The general pur-
pose of this act is to establish for the state 
a system of personnel administration based on 
merit principles and scientific methods govern^ 
ing the appointment, promotion, transfer, layoff, 
removal, discipline and welfare of its civil 
employees." 
There is adequate case authority supporting the 
above statements of these general rules and statutory rule of 
law. 
Although the State of Utah has not had occasion to 
emphasize these principles in its case law, other states have. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Gogerty v. Department of Institutions, 71 Wash, 2d 48, 
426 P.2d 476 (1967), the Court first quotes a portion of its 
civil service statute, which is almost an exact quotation 
of the Utah statute examined above; 
"To establish for the state a system of per-
sonnel administration based on merit principals 
and scientific methods governing the appointment, 
promotion, transfer, layoff, recruitment, reten-
tion, classification and pay plan, removal, dis-
cipline and welfare of its civil employees, and 
other incidents of state employment." (Laws of 
1961 of Wash,, Ch,l, RCW 41,06, at 426 P.2d 478) 
The Court then goes on to say; 
"This declared purpose is clearly within the 
traditional principle of the merit system of 
public employment, i,e. , the delimitation or 
elimination of the spoils system in the matter 
of the selection, appointment, discipline, and 
discharge of civil employees, (426 P.2d at 478, 
emphasis added.) 
Clearly the purpose of Civil Service Legislation is 
fairness in all aspects of employment. Although Gogerty speci-
fically dealt with the alleged unfair suspension of an employee, 
it is clear from the Court's language that the legislation is 
a preventive measure to ensure that discrimination never 
achieves a foothold in any aspect of Civil Service Employment. 
The legislation is to have a prophylactic effect by, in fact, 
preventing any discrimination from infiltrating the program 
before it even has a chance to try to do so, " Herriott v. City 
of Seattle, 81 Wash, 2d 48, 500 P.2d 101 at 109, (1972), 
- 5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Similarly in CivilService Commission of City of 
Tucson v. Livingston, 22 Ariz, App. 183, 525 P.2d 949 (1974), 
the Arizona Court recognized the dangers in allowing one man 
the power to hire and to fire, or to promote and rate arbitrarily. 
"One of the objectives of civil service laws 
is to take from the appointing officer the right 
of arbitrary removal of an appointee, Absent 
such laws a public employee has no protection 
against suspension and removal with or without 
cause.* (525 P.2d at 952) 
The courts and legislatures have recognized throughout 
the recent history of civil service employment system the need 
for standards to prevent arbitrary dismissal or political, 
familial, or emotional hiring and have therefore insisted on 
an impartial and fair system that functions absolutely to the 
letter of the legislative mandate. Burmingham v. Wilkinson, 
239 Ala. 199, 194 So, 548; Fallon v. Nicholson, 136 Colo, 238, 
316 P.2d 1054; People ex rel. Akin v. Kipley, 171 111, 44, 
49 N.E. 229, error dismd. 170 U.S. 182, 42 L. Ed, 998, 18 S. Ct. 
550; Gervais v. New Orleans Police Dept., 226 La. 782, 77 
So. 2d 393; People v. Mosher, 163 N,Y, 32, 57 N,E, 88; Stowe v, 
Ryan, 135 Or. 371, 296 P. 856; Hawkes v. Unemployment Comp. 
Bd. of Review, 145 Pa, Super. 465, 21 A.2d 485; Knoxville v. 
Smith, 176 Tenn. 73, 138 S.W.2d 422, But legislatures have 
not been content to simply allow for a right' of appeal when 
an employee or prospective employee feels he has been treated 
unfairly by a department head. All Civil Service Laws allow 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a department head freedom of choice within very narrow para-
meters. 
"If it is assumed that the Civil Service 
Amendment did not repeal the experience require-
ments of the statute, which expressly we do not 
determine, it, nevertheless, is certain that 
such amendment did confer upon the Civil Service 
Commission, and upon it alone, the discretion 
to ascertain the qualifications, fitness and 
merit of all applicants under the classified 
service,,.1* (People v. Harl, 109 Colo. 223, 
124 P.2d 233 (1942). ~ ~ ~ . . 
Legislatures did not wish one man to administer the 
system but instead created impartial panels of men to administer 
an impartial and objective examination to determine ability, 
fitness and merit. In virtually every case in which the statute 
specifically provides for a panel to ^rate" the applicants, 
that statute is followed strictly. Conover v. Board of Equali-
zation, 44 C.A, 2d 283, 112 P.2d 341 (1941); Vivian v. Bloom, 
115 Colo. 579, 177 P.2d 541 (1947). 
The enforcing of that strict legislative directive 
by the courts ensures the vitality and permanence of fairness 
within the Civil Service System. An objective competitive 
test among applicants, based on an analysis of the position 
sought for, provides for an impartial rating of men as to 
their qualifications. The program is administered by indivi-
duals who will not be directly responsible for the applicants' 
work. More importantly, the supervisor of the man who will 
eventually be hired has absolutely no input into the ranking 
of the applicants, completely eliminating any prejudice, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
emotional, political, or otherwise, from the hiring process. 
The system ensures that only qualified men will be hired, 
Utah law follows this national trend implicitly. 
Chapter 11, Utah Code Ann., entitled Highway Patrol Civil 
Service, clearly defines who is to rate applicants. Sec. 
27-11-5 creates the Civil Service Commission associated with 
the Highway Patrol, Sec, 27^11-6 discusses the qualities of 
impartiality that these men must have in "the selection of 
efficient government personnel * (emphasis added). Sec. 
27-11-7 provides that the chairman must be someone *who has 
known sympathies with the merit system in government service.11 
(emphasis added), Sec, 27^11^8 provides that the Commission 
will set the qualifying standards to be met and Sec, 27-11-10 
indicates that it is the Commission who will indicate to the 
apointing authority, in this case the Commissioner of Public 
Safety, who does and does not qualify for a particular office; 
"(a) The appointing authority must certify 
to the Civil Service Commission the position or 
positions to be filled in said State Highway 
Patrol Department, stating the nature of the 
duties to be performed by such appointee, and 
any peculiar qualification necessary to the 
filling of the position. 
'(b) Upon receipt of such certificate, the 
Civil Service Commission shall certify to the 
appointing authority from its eligible list the 
names of persons appearing thereon having the 
three highest ratings appearing at the top of 
such list." (emphasis added). 
- 8 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1
 In the face of the Utah Legislature^ mandate, the 
pertinent case law and the very important policy considerations 
inherent in the entire Civil Service System it is difficult to 
understand the Civil Service Commission's order ^ "at a rating 
or rank and position to be determined by the Commissioner of 
Public Safety.11 That completely reverses the order of rating 
as dictated by statute, and furthermore, it frustrates the 
purposes of the Civil Service Porgram, It is not because the 
Commissioner has acted in a partial manner in the past or that 
it appears eminent that he will be partial in the immediate 
future that makes this order distasteful. The order is repug-
nant because it impairs a system which guarantees to the public 
that the Commissioner will never even be tempted to be partial. 
The Commission cannot frustrate the system by delegating its 
power to some other agency or person, Hagerman v. Dayton, 
147 Ohio St. 313, 34 Ohio Op. 238, 71 N.E,2d 246, 170 A.L.R. 99. 
Under the circumstances, the Highway Patrol Civil 
Service Commission was in error in its order of January 7, 1976, 
When Mr. Helm has shown his complete dominance of his alcoholic 
problem, he must be reinstated at a rating determined by the 
Commission and not by the Commissioner of Public Safety. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the discretion as to "rating, rank or posi-
tion" for reinstatement is being left to the Commissioner of 
- 9 -
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PuLl i • Safety id f !i.-:j.' 1!h in I. 111. .'I'll J I,. r,'i/,i- «" iinin i, b i >;m , 
petitioner respectfully submits that this portion c: :.> 
Amended Decision Is contrary to the fair intent c - " ' 1 
Service laws, and this Court should reverse the Aiaen^ea 
Decision with a directive order - - • -;e "-tah Highway Patrol 
C:i 1|;; rj ] S e r ,i;: i i ce Commissi on - - i i lg, rank • ::»i: posi -
Lion" for reinstatement determinatio:.. 
; ••. Respectf": : -.:.-..- -.-
/" / ' ' / / f 
Robert M. McRae 
Attorney for P" a;, :\r .. f f ; 
Petitioner 
Mailed a copy of the foregoi ng Pet I t i 01 lei: ', => Brd e f: 
this 12th day of May, 1976, postage prepaid, to Robert B. 
Hansen, Attorney for Defendants and Respondents, Offi ce of 
h 11 o r n e; G e n e r a 1 1 S t a t e :) f U t a I i , U t a I i S t a t e C a p 11 o 1, S a ] t 
Lake C i t y , UT 8 4 1 1 1 , 
• / ' ' / 
• • / / / _ . ' 
•• : > " ' * < L • \ •, " ' 
- - ^ - - " ' • - - ' •
 y
* 
RxSBert M\ McRae " """" 
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